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ABSTRACT

This paper briefly describes Cuban immigration to the United States since the late 1800s, and examines the available demographic and social adjustment data for the latest group of immigrants--the approximately 125,000 persons who came by sea from Mariel Harbor in 1980. The latest wave of Cubans is characterized as poorer, less educated, and less job ready than previous immigrants. In addition, when compared with Cubans already living in the United States, recent arrivals are said to (1) comprise more single individuals, (2) be predominantly male, (3) be younger, and (4) be disproportionately Black or Mulatto. However, the widely believed assertion that the group is largely made up of homosexuals, criminals, and deviants is disputed. Finally, adaptation problems of the Mariel Cubans are discussed in the areas of mental health, housing, and employment. The author concludes with speculation as to the effects on Miami's Cuban American community of the new immigrants, especially given the number of Blacks among the Mariel group and the widespread racial prejudice among earlier immigrants. (GC)

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A LOOK AT THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC ADAPTATION

OF

MARIEL CUBANS

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I. Introduction

The 1980 census estimated that there was some 14.6 million persons of Hispanic origin on the U.S. mainland and an additional 3.2 million in Puerto Rico. Hispanics are generally considered to be one of the fastest growing ethnic groups in the United States. In 1970, Hispanics constituted 4.5% of the total United States mainland population, whereas in 1980 their relative percentage had increased to 6.5%.[1]

The majority of Hispanics on the mainland are Mexican-Americans or Chicanos which constitute 60%. Fourteen percent are Puerto Ricans, 6% are Cuban-Americans, 8% are from Central and South America, and 12% are "other Spanish." Other Spanish may include persons of mixed Hispanic backgrounds.[2] One should be aware that the definition of Hispanic is not always consistent among different data sources or over time within the same source.[3] For example, Hispanics may be either white or black wherein over 90% are classified white by the United States Bureau of the Census.[4] Obviously, this simplistic traditional racial classification scheme is hardly suited to the vast racial groups and mixtures thereof which are common in Latin America.[5] It should be noted also, that these figures may not satisfactorily count all Hispanics due to the cases of alleged undercounting. Certainly, by definition the "illegal" immigrants are also excluded from the count.[6]

Hispanics tend to cluster geographically in a relatively few number of states. For example, approximately 90% of the Mexican-Americans live in the five southwestern states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, and Colorado. About 70% of the Puerto Ricans on the mainland reside in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. In the case of the Cuban-Americans, 60% live in Florida, with another 21% in New York. The Central and South Americans (66%) live in New York and California.[7]

Although Cuban-Americans generally share similar difficulties in the labor market with other Hispanics, e.g., lack of English and education, and discrimination[8]; nevertheless they tend to fare better than the other Hispanic groups. Their participation rates in the labor force is high, unemployment is low, and their median personal income is also high. On the other hand, however, income position of Cuban-Americans is substantially below that of non-Hispanic whites. Also significant for present purposes, these figures do not include the large number (approximately 125,000) of recent Cuban "entrants"[9] from Mariel, called "Marielitos," a majority of which are generally believed to be jobless.[10]

II. Cuban Immigrations

Although the bulk of Cuban immigration to the United States has taken place in the post-revolution era in Cuban (1959), there are previous waves of Cuban immigration which date back to the end of the nineteen century. At that time, there were some 100,000 Cubans concentrated primarily in New York, Tampa, Key West and other Florida cities. Fleeing the Cuban wars of independence from 1868 to 1895, this first wave of Cuban exiles founded the tobacco industry in South Florida and remained to develop the first large community of Cuban-Americans.[11]

In chronological terms, Llanes, identifies three major waves of Cuban immigration from 1959 to 1980. The First Wave began in the aftermath of the Fidel Castro's assuming power in Cuba on January 1, 1959 and ended with the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Approximately 280,000 Cubans entered the United States during this time period. Demographically, the First Wave tended to be rather homogeneous, i.e., mostly white (94%), middle-aged (average 34 years), well-educated (average 14 years of schooling). Politically, they identified with the conservative wing of the Republican Party. In many ways,

they were economically productive for the United States. Being well-educated, sharing a strong work ethic, they were ready, able and willing to compete in the private enterprise system. Some of the Cubans had even been able to bring some capital assets with them. Others had reliable networks of friends, family and/or business associates which eased their transition into United States society.[12]

Between the First and Second Waves, less than 3,000 Cubans entered the United States. The Second Wave began with a dramatic sea lift operation from the Port of Camarioca in 1965 which later became the "Freedom Flights" from Varadero ending in December 1973. An additional 273,000 Cubans entered the United States as part of the Second Wave.[13] This wave was more heterogeneous than the First although whites still constituted the majority there were 24% blacks, mulattos, and Asians. In addition to the well-educated, there were also substantial numbers of tradesmen, carpenters, plumbers, masons, farmers, fishermen, etc. They brought few capital assets with them but they shared the same cultural values with the First Wave relative to work ethic and a drive for self-determination. Also the Second Wave brought more of the academic/intellectual communities. For example, the City of Miami gained over 18,000 lawyers, 2,500 doctors, 1,600 teachers, and 4,600 carpenters, masons, and bricklayers all willing to work for the minimum wage.[14]

Again between the Second and Third Waves, only a small number of Cubans entered the United States. The Third Wave began with the take over of the Peruvian Embassy by more than 10,000 Cubans in April 1980 which led to a massive sea lift operation from the Port of Mariel of over 125,000 persons until it was suddenly ordered close in September/October 1980.[15]

III. Mariel

The 125,000 Cubans that entered the United States via the Mariel-Key West sea lift augmented the existing Cuban-American population in the United

States of 500,000 by 25%. This new immigration opened the doors of the United States after nearly a decade of isolation since the end of the "Freedom Flights" in December 1973. During this hiatus, contact between citizens of Cuba and Cubans in the United States was greatly limited. In fact, the Cuban-American community was the target of much of the anti-American propaganda in Cuba. The Cuban-Americans were known in Cuba by a number of names, such as "gusanos' (worms) as an example. In this context, the Cuban-American community was hardly a primary reference for the Island Cubans.[16]

Beginning in 1979, the Castro Government permitted Cuban=Americans to visit their relatives on the island. In a period of several months, an estimated 100,000 Cuban-Americans returned to Cuba to visit their families bringing with them gifts of clothing, appliances and other customer goods. These Cuban-Americans spent an estimated amount of over $100 millidn on the island. This renewed contact produced a rapid escalation in the importance of the Cuban-American community for Cubans living in Cuba, during 1979, there was a resurgence of political protest activities, e.g,, graffiti and leaflets, and increased escape attempts from the island. Confronted with living proof, the impact of the twenty years of anti-American propaganda faded.[17]

The island Cubans were living in a country which had imposed rationing since 1968 and had experienced repeated difficulties with its sugar and tobacco production which are its leading generators of foreign exchange.[18] The resulting political unrest is understandable in this climate. On April 13, 1980, a group of desperate ex-prisoners are reported to have forced their way into the Peruvian Embassy in Havana.[19] Following this dispute in which a Cuban guard was killed, the Cuban Government removed all the guards from the Peruvian Embassy which precipated a mad rush culminating in nearly 11,000 persons in the Embassy. Later, after arrangements had been hastily made, about 500 Cubans

were flown to Costa Rica and Spain. From the very beginning it was clear that the vast majority wanted to come to the United States. Shortly thereafter, Castro announced that he was opening up the Port at Mariel and invited the Cuban-Americans to come and pick up their relatives. The move was unexpected and in the absence of any formal regulation of the process by the United States, literally hundreds of small boats of every description were chartered by Cuban-Americans and headed for Mariel.[20]

For simplicity, the Cubans who arrived via Mariel-Key West might be classified in three categories:

1) Dissidents, mostly single men who crowded into the Peruvian Embassy whose numbers reached around 10,800. They were among the first to leave Cuba.

2) Relatives of Cuban-Americans around 60,000 plus thousands more who had relatives in the United States who were unable or unwilling to take them in, and

3) Involuntary entrants, e.g., ex-convicts, mental patients, homosexuals, troublemakers and other undesirables accounting for approximately 23,970 individuals.[21] It was this group that the press seized upon to characterize the entire Mariel immigration.[22] "Marielito," a denigrating term roughly translated means, "the poor little one from Mariel," is heard increasingly on the streets of Cuban-American communities.[23]

IV. Resettlement

The Mariel entrants experienced varying degrees of difficulties in the process of resettlement and adjustment. The experiences in the camps proved to be very frustating, even traumatic, for many people who had arrived in the United States expecting to find an "open arms" welcome and a relative smooth transition into a higher American standard of living.[24] Sponsorship was a very imperfect end product of a complicated process that involved a "leap of faith" on the part of the voluntary agency which sought to match sponsor with entrant.[25]

The entrants most easily processed and placed were, of course, those with family members and close relatives in the United States. The majority of these entrants moved through the immigration process within days or weeks of arrival.[26] These entrants were demographically similar to previous Cuban exiles in that they tended to be white, female, and married.[27] As of August 1981, there were already approximately 80,446 (or 60% of the total Mariel entrants) settled in Dade County, Florida. Some 54,371 live in the City of Miami, and about 19,000 live in the City of Hialeah based on the addresses of the sponsors or relatives.[28] It is interesting to note that many of the entrants were rejected by their own families in the United States apparently, not because they were dangerous but because they appeared to be vivid reminders of recent deprivations and threatened their sponsors with loss of painfully acquired status.[29]

Surprisingly, the homosexuals proved to be among the easiest groups to sponsor because they had few mental problems. Also homosexual organizations from all over the United States immediately offered their assistance.[30] This reception is in stark contrast to the harassment and possible imprisonment of homosexuals in Cuba where it is culturally abhorrent to Cubans running counter to the spirit of "machismo."[31]

Given the Cuban fondness of boxing, the best prize-fighters were sponsored by prospective managers.[32] Some sponsors sought cheap labor from entrants who would be willing to work for extremely low pay in order to be released from the camps.[33] There were even reports of some young women being settled with sponsors who attempted to employ them as prostitutes.[34]

An important feature of the Mariel exodus is the higher visibility of blacks. Estimates range from 20% to 40%.[35] It is probably safe to state that 40% might even be a conservative estimate.[36] The percentage of black entrants

in Fort Indiantown Gap rose from 14% on May 30, 1980 to 50% as of the end of August 1980, indicating that sponsors for this group were not easy to find.[37] By comparison 90% of the South Florida arrivals were white against 50% estimate in the camps. The fact that a substantial share of the Mariel Cubans were black or mulatto indicates, on the one hand, a closer approximation to the racial composition in the source population (about 25%) and on the other, a significant new contribution to the Cuban-American community. To what extent this new racial component influenced the unprecedented negative portrayal of Cuban emigrants is a question that few have dared even to ask, let alone answer.[38] These racial and ethnic prejudices inherent in the difficulty in locating the highly prized well-paid jobs that they were led to expect, many times by Cuban-Americans visiting in Cuba, plus the all too often unsuccessful reunions with family members who live in a culture drastically different from the one which the entrants left have all contributed substantially to the disappointment, despair, and depression that many Mariel Cubans experience.[39]

The secondary migration is an important issue. During the previous waves of Cuban immigration, many Cubans who were relocated or resettled outside of Florida, especially the North, have returned or plan to eventually return to Miami.[40] For example, in 1971, some 300,000 Cuban refugees or 70% of the then recent arrivals had been relocated outside of the State of Florida.[41] By 1978, one out of every four Cubans living in Dade County had lived previously in New York/New Jersey area.[42] Later surveys indicate that the proportion of those "returnees" from earlier Cuban migrations is as high as 40% of the Cuban population in Miami. There is no reason to suspect that the same secondary migration pattern will not occur with the latest Cuban immigration from Mariel.[43]

Although the bulk of the new Cubans have settled in Miami, the New York/New Jersey bistate area has the other sizeable enclave of Cubans. It has been

estimated that some 10,000 have settled there.[44] As the colder weather set in, however, a secondary migration of undetermined magnitude to Miami began. Among most of the Mariel Cubans, Miami with its strong Latin ambiance is generally regarded as the place to be. The lack of English should not necessarily be a barrier in finding some kind of job.[45] Contrary to the conventional wisdom the strategy of relocation is not necessarily the best route for successful adaptation to life in United States society. A recent study tends to suggest that immigrants who stay in clusters with the basic support systems have better than those who are more dispersed into the general population.[46]

Some of the Mariel Cubans who apparently thought that they could live off the fat of the land are experiencing difficulties in adapting themselves to life in the United States.[47] Apparently, twenty years of life in a communist paternalistic society had not prepared them for a life in a competitive free enterprise system.[48]

Unlike the earlier waves of Cubans who came to the United States, the latest group was poorer, less educated, and less job ready.[49] The 1980 Mariel exodus had occurred at a bad time, not only because the public expressed on anti-immigration mood, with United States citizens pressed by unemployment, inflation, and foreign conflict (e.g. the hostage crisis in Iran), but because of the effort to reform the immigration law. This fortitious combination of these factors elevated the significance of the Cuban-immigration to unwarranted importance in relation to other pressing national problems. In other words, these entrants became associated with all kinds of social and economic ills, especially unemployment.[50] One estimate is that approximately one-half of the Mariel Cubans in the work force are unemployed.[51] In September 1980, the Dade County School system had to absorb on additional 15,000 new Cuban youngsters.[52] These refugee children were taunted in school while their parents were shunned by employers and merchants and even by many in the flourishing

Cuban community established over twenty-years before.[53] The Jackson Memorial Hospital, the county's public hospital, was swamped also by the new arrivals approximately 18% or 13,000 out of the 724,142 patients admitted or treated as outpatients from October 1980 to July 1981, were Mariel Cubans.[54] In Florida, the monthly subsistence checks of $119.00 were discontinued after about 18 months in the United States. In desperation, some of the welfare officials advised clients of the states where they might qualify for additional benefits. For example, they listed Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Wyoming or states where the Cubans could qualify for continuing aid.[55] Many of the Mariel Cubans banded together to form information and referral networks of their own to keep abreast of the changing benefits and entitlement programs.[56] It should also be noted that a number of Mariel Cubans requested to be returned to Cuba. The must desperate ones, more than 25, tried to return to Cuba by hijacking passenger airplanes.[57]

V. Profile of Mariel Cubans

The available data on Mariel Cubans indicate that they are different in the following ways from earlier Cuban immigrants. They are more likely:

1) to have been in unskilled or manual labor jobs in Cuba and less likely to have been in white-collar or professional jobs than the earlier groups.[58] Based on data collected at the four major camps, i.e., Eglin, Chaffee, Indiantown Gap, and McCoy, the Mariel Cubans were concentrated in craft (25.3%), labor (18.8%), machine operative (15.4%), and transport operative (11.0%) jobs. These occupations reflect the Mariel Cubans' origins in the larger cities where factory service, and construction jobs prevail. Very few of the Mariel Cubans were farm laborers (2.0%) or farmers (1.4%). Many of the farm laborers were sugar cane cutters. The number of professional and technical workers was higher than

what might have been expected given the negative publicity. Over 9% of the Mariel Cubans confined to the camps reported that type of employment.[59]

2) to be single than earlier immigrants. The Mariel Cubans report 33% single persons versus 15% for the previous groups up to 1971.[60] Also, the Mariel Cubans show a higher divorce rate of 10.7% against only 5% for earlier Cubans.[61]

3) to be predominately male. The percentage of males among the Mariel Cubans was 70.2% versus 42.1% among the Varadero-Miami Freedom Flights.[62]

4) to be within a more narrow age range. A smaller portion of the Mariel Cubans were under 18 years of age (20.1%), which contrasted with the 33.5% for the airlift arrivals. However, the median age of the Mariel Cubans tended to be younger with a full 68.5% below 36 years of age.[63] The arrival of this large segment of young single males provided an interesting, although relatively uninvestigated, strategy of adaptation on the part of the Mariel Cubans. Undetermined numbers joined the females from the previous immigrations in a variety of male-female relationship from formal marriage to move casual unions. The females tended to be older, and well established in the United States with respect to career, income and property. It is also interesting to note that Cubans rarely marry across ethnic and racial lines. For example, in 1980, only 15% of all Dade County marriages were between Spanish-surnamed whites and non-Spanish-surnamed whites, while 8% between Spanish-surnamed blacks and non-Spanish-surnamed blacks, and 4% between Spanish surnamed whites and Spanish-surnamed blacks.[64] Given the previous sexual discrimination against Cuban males in the previous waves, the arrival of the young, single Mariel males seems to be complementing the previous sexual imbalance leading to the formation of more all Cuban family units.

5) to be black or mulatto. Although blacks and mulattos make up about 25% of the population of Cuba, the earlier Cuban immigrants were predominantly

white (95%). The Mariel Cubans were from 60% to 80% white.[65] The discrepancies probably result from the attempts to classify the mulattos, i.e., racial mixed. Undoubtedly, many of the lighter mulattos will attempt to pass for white in the United States.[66] Race like beauty tends to be in the eye of the beholder.

The average level of schooling of the Mariel Cubans based on a survey taken in Miami was 9 years which compares closely to the level of schooling of the Second Wave immigrants. As would be expected, only about 2% to 5% of the Mariel Cubans could communicate in English upon arrival.[67] These were probably descendants of the West Indians who settled in Cuban early in the twentieth century.

VI. Adaptation Problems

A. Mental Health

Upon arrival of the Mariel Cubans, a myth that they were basically convicts and mental patients was quickly created. As of December 1980, Sergio Pereira, Assistant Dade County Manager noted that only 2,750 of the Cubans had been either jailed or committed to mental institutions.[68] It had been reported that there were some 600 mental patients among the Mariel Cubans according to one source.[69] A study conducted in the camps found that the rate of mental disorders was normal for the population size.[70] For example, at Fort Chaffee around February 1981, 95 patients were being treated in the psychiatric ward which compared favorably to a normal rate of mental disorders.[71] It has been found that refugees develop more psychological problems when the period between immigration and final settlement is prolonged. Also, people who migrate involuntarily, understandably have been observed to exhibit markedly increased rates of mental disorders.[72] For instance, the resettlement agencies and Cuban community organization in the New York area report that the Mariel Cubans are experiencing

a number of severe readjustment problems such as alcoholism.[73] In a study of 549 unaccompanied minors the following mental health profile has been developed:

1) 47% experienced behavioral problems in Cuba
2) 14% experienced hallucinations
3) 8% experienced delusions
4) 31% experienced clinical depression
5) 22% admitted suicidal tendencies
6) 14% had attempted suicide.

The area of mental health, if not properly provided for, can emerge in later years as an especially problem area for successful adaptation of a substantial number (unknown which underscores the need for more attention in this area), Mariel Cubans whose behavior may turn more anti-social in the near future.

B. Housing

Given the overwhelming geographical preference for Miami of the vast majority of the Mariel Cubans housing becomes a crucial element in their eventual successful adaptation to life in the United States. As of April 1980, apartment vacancies in Dade County were at 0.4% of 1% (or 4 per 1,000). One study revealed that only 8.7% of the Mariel Cubans were living in dwellings paid for out of their own funds, 86.4% were either forced to share housing with relatives or friends and/or lived in rooms or apartments paid for by relatives, friends, or religious organizations. Another 4.5% lived in factory building, or cars owned by a friend, or remained in the former site of Tent City, under the I-95 highway. On the average, homes with Mariel Cubans have 80% more people living in them than normal. For example, a former home of eight people may now hold 14 and up to 22 in some cover. People are found sleeping in living rooms, dining rooms, dens, kitchens, garages and even in outside sheds. The general overcrowding has led to the occupation of premises previously deemed unfit for human habitation.[74]

C. Unemployment

Until April 1980, Dade County had enjoyed one of the lowest unemployment rates (5%) in the nation. By October 1980, however, it had one of the highest unemployment rates in the nation at 13%. By July 1981, 77% of the Mariel Cubans still had not found permanent employment, and even excluding part-timers and people with temporary jobs, the unemployment rate for Mariel Cubans stand at 66%. Since the "entrant is status pending" classification did not entitle them to unemployment compensation and other benefits, being unemployed was tantamount to being left to starve.[75]

D. Crime

The press had repeatedly publicized crimes committed by the Mariel Cubans.[76] There have been many reports of "a criminal class among the latest Cuban exodus."[77] There are even allegations that "Castro set among ar open society a vicious new criminal force" and further that "Castro's outlaw invasion" has not yet been recognized nor confronted by national law enforcement officials.[78] It has been widely reported that among the Mariel Cubans there were many considered socially or politically deviant in Cuba and inmates of the prisons, hospitals and psychiatric wards who were allegedly dumped on the docks.[79] The figures and categories of these undesirables vary according to the particular source. It appears that some common criminals were released from jail and mental institutions to make the crossing into the United States.[80] Also the juvenile delinquent farms were purged.[81] To complete the round up of political and social deviant (anti-sociales) certain ex-convicts, homosexuals, vagrants, suspected black marketeers, and assorted troublemakers were offered one-way passage to the United States under pain of imprisonment or other punishment.[82] Boat owners and charterers discovered that they had to transport these people if their family and friends were to be permitted to leave.[83] One estimate of these involuntary immigrants list:

5,486 as jailed for political crimes,
16,710 as jailed for minor crimes,
1,774 as jailed for serious felonies,
600 as former mental patients, and
1,500 as possibly homosexuals.[84]

During screening in the United States, one estimate reports the Immigration and Nationalization Service identified fewer than 2,000 or criminals.[85] Diaz estimates the minority of harden criminals mong the Mariel Cubans to be from 500 to 2,000.[86] At a later date, the United States Immigration authorities ruled about 1,900 as "excludable aliens."[87] As January 1983, approximately 1,000 of these people remain in the federal penitentiary in Atlanta where a class-action suit has been brought on behalf of the Cubans to free them.[88]

In the wake of the outbreak of crime in Miami various estimates of the criminals place their number from 20,000[89] to 25,000.[90] It is very possible that a substantial number of criminals avoided detection by lying about their criminal past[91] and the refusal of Cuban government to provide records. Much of the homicide involving Mariel Cubans their victims tend also to be Mariel Cubans.[92] Of all deaths among Mariel Cubans, as of June 1981, 62.1% have been homicides.[93] Apparently a number of Mariel Cubans have carried over their grudges from Cuba to settle the scores in the United States.[94] Certainly many experience high levels of frustation as they see themselves surrounded by a world of overabundance in which they are not yet able to participate.[95]

Clearly, the existence of a criminal plays, as yet an undetermined, role in the criminal activities in the area. But other factors such as unemployment, lack of financial assistance, plus the rejection and/or apprehension on the established Cuban-American community must also be taken into account. Official statistics appear to confirm the hypothesis that the increase in the crime rate, especially in the little Havana area, is related to the massive influx of Mariel

Cubans.[96] However, a survey of the Dade County Jail on December 26, 1980 revealed that out of the 1,051 inmates in the population on that day only 103 were Mariel Cubans representing less than one tenth of one percent of the estimated 90,000 who had settled in Dade County as of that date. It is very possible that the Mariel Cubans may have been used as convenient "scapegoats" for the increase in the crime rate in the Miami area.[97, 98]

VII. Concluding Remarks

Beginning with the professionals, landowners, and businessmen of the 1960's, the successive waves of these migrant flows have brought to the United States, a virtual cross-section of Cuban society. The Mariel exodus completes the process, in form if not number, by only contributing members of the working class but also by reaching into the Island's racial and regional subgroups to a greater extent than before.[99] Of course, one of the most salient features has been the substantial numbers of blacks and mulattos who had been excluded from previous waves. There are a number of questions of how these people with the double handicaps of racial and ethnicity will adapt to life in the United States. Also, it will be interesting to observe what support, if any, will be forthcoming from their white countrymen in the established Cuban-American community. Cubans, like most Latin Americans, generally attempt to avoid the painful discussions of racial prejudice and discrimination in their midst. They are only too happy to place the blame of any inadvertent racism on their part on the Americans who they say taught them. For a number of years, when the Cuban-American community was predominately (90% to 95%) white, Cuban could safely forget of the existence of one black or mulatto out of every four Cubans on the Island. Cubans projected a sort of pride in their racial purity especially as compared to the mestizo Mexican-American, the mulatto Puerto Rican or Dominican, or the Indian Central or South American. Now the influx of 20%

to 40% of the 125,000 Mariel Cubans, will cause the Cuban-Americans to admit begrudgingly that there are black Cubans.[100] Mariel has brought anywhere from 25,000 to 50,000 new black Cubans to confront and demolish the "white-only" myth of the Cuban-American community. Paraphrasing Nicolas Guillen, the Cuban-American community in the United States will soon know that it is mulatto. The question as to what extent, if any, did the arrival of so many black Cubans influence the negative portrayal of Mariel Cubans demands to be raised formally for an adequate response.

The arrival of the criminal element also raises a number of short, medium, and long-term questions which need to be posed and answered.

The ambivalent reception accorded to the Mariel Cubans was undoubtedly a function of the overdramatic depictions of their social and racial character. Beyond the exaggerated characterizations, much of the ambivalence not only reflected but was caused by the ambiguity in immigration policy. Since the 1960's the Cuban emigration has been the prime model for the generous United Refugee policy. The events of the Mariel Boatlift of the Spring-Summer 1980, for all intents and purposes signed an end to that "open arms" policy. Yet, the question of how to define, admit, process and resettle future refugees still remains unanswered.

One would hope that in the near future additional research will be undertaken by competent investigators to clarify many of the vexing and nagging questions raised during the course of the present paper.

NOTES

[1] _____, Hispanics and Jobs: Barriers to Progress, (National Commission for Employment Policy: Washington, D.C.), Report No. 14, September 1982, pp. 2-3.

[2] Ibid., p. 10.

[3] Ibid., p. 5.

[4] Massey, "The Demographic and Economic Position," Increasing the Earnings of Disadvantaged Women, (National Commission for Employment Policy: Washington, D.C.), Report No. 11, January 1981 cited in Hispanics and Jobs: Barriers to Progress, op. cit., p. 25.

[5] Heriberto Dixon, "Who Ever Heard of a Black Cuban," Afro-Hispanic Review, Vol. 1, No. 3, September 1982, p. 10.

[6] _____, Hispanics and Jobs: Barriers to Progress, op. cit. p. 16.

[7] Ibid., p. 3.

[8] Ibid., p. 2.

[9] "The Cuban/Haitian 'entrant' status is a confusing legal category specifically covering those Haitians in Immigration and Naturalization Service proceedings as of October 10, 1980 and Cubans who arrived between April 20, and October 10, 1980. Entrants, i.e., status pending, were not formally admitted to the United States, but have been legally permitted to stay indefinitely." See: Lilia Fernandez, "The U.S. as 'Country of First Asylum,'" (United Methodist Committee On Relief: New York), a paper, p. 1.

[10] _____, Hispanics and Jobs: Barriers to Progress, op. cit. p. 12.

[11] Guarione M. Diaz, "La cambiante communidad cubana," El Miami Herald, August 16, 1981, p. 9.

[12] Jose Llanes, Cuban Americans: Masters of Survival, (Abt Books: Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 9, 10.

[13] Ibid., p. 8.

[14] Ibid., pp. 98-99.

[15] Ibid., p. 9.

[16] _____, Social and Economic Problems Among Cuban and Haitian Entrant Groups in Dade County, Florida: Trends and Indications, (Metropolitan Dade County: Miami, Florida, August 1981).

[17] Juan M. Clark, Jose I. Lasaga and Rose S. Reque, The 1980 Mariel Exodus: An Assessment and Prospect, (Council for Inter-American Security: Washington, D.C.), Special Report 1981, p. 2.

[18] For example: see Alberto Recarte, Cuba: economia y poder (1959-1980), (Alianza Universidad: Madrid, 1980).

[19] Juan Vives, Los Amos de Cuba, (Emece Editores: Buenos Aires, 1982), p. 214.

[20] Juan Clark, et al., op. cit. pp. 2-6.

[21] Paul Montgomery, "For Cuban Refugees: Promise of U.S. Fades," New York Times, April 19, 1981.

[22] James Conaway,"Unwanted Immigrants: Cuban Prisoners in America," Atlantic, 247 No. 2, February 1981, p. 74.

[23] Paul Montgomery, op. cit.

[24] Elice Higginbothom, "The Difficulties of Resettlement," Cuba Times, no date available.

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